

# International Economic Competition as a Catalyst for Climate Coalitions: Converting Climate Skeptics in the United States

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## Abstract

Green spending policies are popular, yet they encounter strong opposition from ideological groups skeptical of climate change. This paper explores methods to persuade climate skeptics to endorse green spending by proposing a new theory on how individuals ideologically evaluate climate policies. We argue that individuals' support or opposition to climate policies not only depends on their stance towards the environmental objectives, but also on their views about the economic mechanisms employed to achieve these goals. We hypothesize that framing climate policies as enhancing national competitiveness may increase support, particularly among conservatives and anti-globalists, who are typically skeptical of climate initiatives. To examine this theory, we conducted two pre-registered survey experiments with 2,337 American participants. The first experiment, a vignette, prompted respondents to consider competitive dynamics with China, leading to a significant increase in approval for corporate tax subsidies for electric vehicle manufacturers. In pre-specified heterogeneity analyses of partisanship and climate opinions, we observed this trend particularly among ex-ante climate skeptics, who shifted from opposing green corporate subsidies to supporting them. In a conjoint experiment, we generalize these treatment findings across a higher number of dimensions. We found broad support for individual tax incentives and job creation, while climate skeptics showed a greater preference for corporate tax incentives and economic competitiveness. These findings offer crucial understanding for policymakers seeking politically sustainable approaches to promoting environmental initiatives, while providing insight into the evolution of international distributive conflict over the green transition. Furthermore, we offer insight into the realignment of the international order as countries enact more economically nationalist policies in pursuit of global goods.

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Governments are almost universally committed to limiting climate change by reducing carbon emissions. Given that governments are responding to market failures and redistributing climate-related goods, political economy is at the center of climate policy (Aklin and Mildemberger 2020). Leaders must navigate the winners and losers of the green transition to build a politically sustainable coalition (Meckling et al. 2015). Governments must strike the balance of overcoming opposition from concerned interest groups while sustaining broad-based electoral support for their program (Finnegan 2022).

To attract support from interest groups, policymakers have converged upon a new consensus of green industrial policy. Unlike the regulatory stick of carbon taxation, green industrial policy proffers targeted carrots to encourage market investment in clean-tech and renewable energy (Matsuo and Schmidt 2019). In so doing, states can overcome or sideline potential political obstructions by concentrated groups who would be hurt by the green transition (Meckling and Nahm 2022). Unlike carbon taxation, in which the beneficiaries are the diffuse general public, the winners of industrial policy are well-placed to recognize the benefits they get from pro-climate policies (Meckling 2021). Over time those policies can further entrench a broader array of pro-climate interests that actively promote the green transition in other dimensions (Meckling et al. 2015).

However, it is not clear that green industrial policy is supported by mass electorates. Green growth through investment tends to be described as a public good supported by the average voter (Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022). Yet this presumption elides the broader variance in individual opinion over both climate change and fiscal politics. Even on average, it is far from clear that individuals simply prefer more public investment to less (Bansak, Bechtel, and Margalit 2021), including in climate policy, where expensive proposals are consistently punished in survey experiments (Bechtel, Scheve, and Lieshout 2022a). More importantly, mass publics are divided on climate policy by partisanship, with right-wing groups opposing green initiatives (Burgess et al. 2024; Kulin, Johansson Sevä, and Dunlap 2021). The cost and the nature of government intervention should make green industrial policy doubly antithetical to traditional fiscal conservatism. Opposition from these right-wing opponents can undermine the efficacy of climate policy (Voeten 2024). How, then, can policymakers win over climate skeptics to support green industrial policy?

One way may be to frame climate policy as making a country economically competitive with international peers, which is how some political leaders have been selling green industrial policy to voters. The United States's 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a clear example of green industrial policy, with over \$800bn in government spending earmarked for public investments, such as lending through green banks and subsidies to incentivize green corporate investment. The IRA is broadly popular but faces stiff opposition from conservative Republicans (Leiserowitz et al. 2023), who have suggested it supports foreign businesses (Smith 2023). President Biden has responded by pitching the IRA to potential voters as

a bill about economic competition, declaring in a speech at a green manufacturing plant, “When I hear climate, I think jobs... all across of America, instead of exporting jobs, companies both foreign and domestic are creating jobs here in America and exporting American-made products” (Biden 2023).

We propose a theory about individuals’ preferences on climate policies that suggests framing a policy as competitive can be an effective tool to win over climate skeptics. Individuals evaluate climate policies over two dimensions: the end goal of reaching the green transition and the economic instrument the government uses to attain the goal. When a government sets an agenda to reduce carbon emissions, it creates distributional conflict between material winners and losers but also between ideological proponents and skeptics. The material divide forms the first core of interest, and much scholarship has examined how such losers can be convinced to support green policies through tax rebates, redistribution, and social policy bundling (e.g. Bergquist, Mildenerger, and Stokes 2020; Breetz, Mildenerger, and Stokes 2018; Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022; Gazmararian and Tingley 2023).

We suggest that the government can also win back climate skeptics through the ideological component of policy design. How people want the government to intervene in the market is one of the most fundamental divisions in politics (Hibbs 1977). Policymakers can marry a pro-climate objective with economic instruments that are amenable to conservative economic ideologies, and thus win over climate skeptics who approve of the policy’s broader impact on the economy. In particular, contemporary conservatives are motivated by a backlash to globalization that sees them prioritize national well-being and competitiveness (Ballard-Rosa, Goldstein, and Rudra 2024; Walter 2021). Thus, climate policies which promote the economic competitiveness of a country will garner support from traditional climate opponents, enabling a broader climate coalition.

We test this framing experimentally with a pair of pre-registered survey experiments fielded in the United States.<sup>1</sup> We first employ a vignette experiment with a two-arm factorial design. In the first treatment, we randomly present respondents with information on a hypothetical tax credit designed to encourage the creation of new automobile manufacturing jobs, randomizing whether the jobs will be for either electric vehicles or generic production. We anchor our treatment in tax credits because they are highly visible to individuals and used by politicians to pander for votes (Jensen and Malesky 2018), are at the core of new forms of trade conflict over clean technology (Meckling 2021), and, for the American context, make up the grand majority of federal spending in the IRA (Service 2022). In the second treatment arm, we randomly present respondents with information framing the tax credits within the context of economic competition with China. Respondents overall are more likely to support the electric vehicle climate credits framed within the context of eco-

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1. Pre-registration: [https://osf.io/zut4m/?view\\_only=59ce23b1021947c399ffceead1e962ae](https://osf.io/zut4m/?view_only=59ce23b1021947c399ffceead1e962ae). Survey fielded on Lucid in January 2024.

conomic competition. The framing is particularly effective at moving respondents who were ex-ante opposed to climate action and who punished green policy without a competition cue.

We follow the vignette with a discrete choice conjoint experiment expanding the scope of possible climate policies to explore the generalizability of our vignette’s treatment effects. We randomize across a variety of attributes relevant for green industrial policy. We find that while our overall pool of respondents prefer climate policy that provides climate tax credits directly to consumers and is primarily focused on addressing the effects of climate change (both domestically and internationally), there are key heterogeneous effects. Most pertinently, climate opponents were more likely to prefer climate policies framed within the context of economic competition.

Our paper makes several key contributions. First, we introduce a new element to the study of individuals’ preferences about climate policy: economic ideology. In particular, we propose that climate policies which are seen as competitive internationally will win over support from climate opponents. We do indeed find that more competitive policies are more supported by climate opponents, making them overall more likely to support the climate policy. Second, while most scholarship has focused on market correcting policies like carbon taxation, many policymakers have moved toward market interventions such as tax credits. This is reflected in the broader shift toward green industrial policy, such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Green industrial policy is a wide-ranging policy paradigm and offers fertile ground for a host of studies. We offer one step toward that by examining individual preferences over green corporate tax credits in a vignette experiment, and then expanding into a broader set of policies in a conjoint experiment. Third, we contribute to the broader conversation in international relations about the future of the liberal international order and cooperation. Much of international trade is built on norms which disavow industrial policy, which had led to an increasing number of disputes over green industrial policy, whether between the U.S. and Europe over the market distortions in the IRA or the burgeoning competition between the U.S. and China over electric vehicles. If these policies and the competition they engender prove domestically popular, this suggests high levels of green spending may come at the cost of long-held norms of economic interaction.

## 1 Compensating Climate Losers

As with any major initiative, politicians must attract sufficient support from the beneficiaries of green industrial policy while compensating policy losers. With climate politics in particular, policymakers face material losers and ideological skeptics. Here we first provide a brief overview of existing scholarship on material compensation, and then propose our theory of ideological compensation.

To outline our argument, we suggest that green industrial policy is an effective policy

paradigm for generating public support on average and specifically from climate change opponents. One central element of green industrial policy is the privileging of certain businesses and industries, such as through clean energy corporate tax credits, in order to make their production globally competitive. The focus on international economic competition will be popular broadly, but will especially draw in individuals who traditionally oppose climate-friendly policies, such as the economic nationalists that make up a growing base of conservative support.

## 1.1 Material Redistribution

Individuals may be materially affected by the physical damage of climate change to their region and also may be economically affected by industrial transitions away from high-carbon sectors into cleaner energy production (Colgan and Hinthorn 2023). Both of these effects may concentrate geographically, limiting the ability of individuals to overcome deleterious effects on their own (Egan and Mullin 2012; Lim, Aklin, and Frank 2023; Zhang et al. 2018).

Given the disparate impacts both climate change and climate mitigation and adaptation policies have on individuals, effective climate action has to win over material losers through side payments or redistribution (Arel-Bundock and Pelc 2023). Individuals tend to prefer policies that they see as redistributionary or as returning funds to their communities (Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019), though the kind of material threat people face structures their preferred policies (Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022).

However, material compensation has yet to be sufficient to enable an ideal policy like carbon taxation. Individuals tend to be distrustful of carbon taxation, seeing it as regressive or ineffective (Carattini, Carvalho, and Fankhauser 2018a; Douenne and Fabre 2022). People also strongly dislike government interventions that will personally cost them more (Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2024). Although some variations in design have generated more support than others (Bechtel, Scheve, and van Lieshout 2020), the consistency of these findings should not be all that surprising given the visibility of the tax on a product that consumers are highly attentive to (Kyle 2018).

## 1.2 Ideological Compensation

The inadequacy of material compensation to date is partially because of the pure cost of such policies, but also partially because of ideological opposition to climate policy. Public opinion concerning action to address climate change is polarized along partisan lines, in the U.S. and elsewhere (Burgess et al. 2024; Davidovic, Harring, and Jagers 2020; Egan and Mullin 2017; Tyson, Funk, and Kennedy 2023), and this polarization has only increased over time (Egan, Konisky, and Mullin 2022). Additionally, immaterial factors like race (Benegal, Azevedo, and Holman 2022), symbolic racism (Benegal 2018; Parajon 2024), national-

ism (Kulin, Johansson Sevä, and Dunlap 2021) or perceived fairness in institutional design (Huber, Wicki, and Bernauer 2019) may also play a significant role in how members of the public perceive climate action.

Policymakers may thus also try to win climate supporters through ideological compensation. By this, we mean bundling climate policies with other policies that individuals wish to see enacted, regardless of material benefit. For instance, bundling climate policies with social goals like affordable housing may increase support for green initiatives (Bergquist, Mildenerger, and Stokes 2020). Climate policies like the Inflation Reduction Act may come with explicit targeting for low-income and diverse communities that is used to generate support amongst left-wing individuals who prioritize economic and racial justice (Kelly, Roberts, and Chang 2024; SenateDemocrats 2022). Individuals also prefer climate policies which they see as more globally cooperative (Bechtel, Scheve, and van Lieshout 2022b). By offering individuals progress toward other desired goals alongside the climate agenda, politicians can generate a wider range of support.

However, most of the ideologically compensatory policies studied so far are targeted toward left-leaning individuals, who are already more likely to support climate change initiatives and thus are less crucial to convince to join the climate coalition. Of more dire need is for ideological compensation directed to the opponents of climate change.

## 2 Compensating Climate Skeptics

We posit that green policies are evaluated by individuals by more than just their pro-climate objective, but also by the means with which they intend to achieve the objective. The mechanisms are of central importance to individuals because transitioning to clean energy will radically change the structure of the economy (Gabor and Braun 2023). This opens up a second ideological dimension for climate initiatives: how governments should intervene in markets.

Beliefs on this dimension are the defining elements of economic ideology (Hibbs 1977). Disagreements about governments and markets are at the core of political disagreements writ large, including fundamental policies like tax collection and federal interest rates (Hall and Soskice 2001). When there is sufficient consensus on these beliefs amongst policymakers and the public, they crystallize into broad macroeconomic paradigms that govern government policy for decades (Blyth 2002). The manner and form in which governments intervene in markets therefore obviously matter deeply to individuals (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995).

Traditionally, climate policy has meant intervening in the form of market *correction*, and then allowing markets to drive the green transition. Carbon taxation is the paradigmatic policy, in which governments set prices to account for carbon emissions and allow markets to function with new information (Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2024; Carattini, Carvalho,

and Fankhauser 2018b). However, over the past decade, mass support for market-correcting policies in general has waned drastically (Bonanno 2017). Individuals are now much more opposed to standard liberal policies like free trade and immigration (Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra 2021), and are instead turning toward policies emblematic of market *distortion*. Green industrial policy is exemplary of market distortion, in which governments use fiscal expenditures to offer targeted incentives and put a finger on the scale of market competition (Meckling and Nahm 2022). Market distortions like trade protectionism are returning to popularity (Ballard-Rosa, Goldstein, and Rudra 2024). We suggest that climate policies which are more distortionary will also benefit from this public support, particularly amongst climate opponents.

In particular, the salient feature for distortionary green industrial policy is the emphasis on international competition. Market correcting policies like carbon taxation are fundamentally intended to work when countries cooperate on the rules. Market distortions, however, are meant to generate domestic “winners” which can compete internationally to produce and export green products (Rodrik 2014). The state’s goal is to direct national management of the green transition through preferred firms and industries. Privileging these domestic actors reduces reliance on international partners to reach policy objectives. This intervention into markets is highlighted by the global surge in international competition over cleantech, driven by green industrial policy (Meckling 2021).

We expect that climate policies which emphasize making the home country more competitive will be popular amongst members of the general public. People care deeply about the job security of themselves and their compatriots (Mansfield and Mutz 2013), and change their economic preferences drastically when primed to think about competition for jobs (Ashok and Gaikwad 2021). They also reward politicians who make even unsuccessful efforts to compete for investment (Jensen and Malesky 2018). When people are primed to think of a climate policy as making their country more economically competitive, they will be more approving of the green initiative. Thus, our first hypothesis is:

**Hypothesis 1.** *Individuals will be **more** likely to support a climate policy that is framed within the context of international economic competition.*

We anticipate that the market-distorting emphasis on competition and the perceived positive economic effects will be especially popular amongst groups of individuals ex-ante most opposed to climate policy overall. In the United States and globally, ideological opposition to climate policies comes from the right (Egan and Mullin 2017; Goldberg et al. 2021). This is broadly the same group of people opposed to globalization, and who want to institute more market distortions that privilege domestic economies (Walter 2021). Market-distorting climate policies which emphasize economic competition will appeal to the nationalist and interventionist economic modes of these anti-climate individuals. They will remain less likely than ex-ante pro-climate individuals to support climate policies on average, but they will

see economic competition over green investment as a means of promoting national welfare and creating economic benefits. Green industrial policy serves as a means of ideological compensation to draw these right-wing individuals in to support climate initiatives. Thus, our second hypothesis is:

**Hypothesis 2.** *The effect of the economic competition framing will be more positive for right-wing and climate skeptical individuals.*

Crucially, however, we expect that emphasizing economic competition will not lose left-wing supporters. This is critical for green industrial policy to sustain mass support. As politicians attract climate opponents, they must not lose climate proponents because of distaste for the economic ideology the government pursues. We expect this for two reasons. First, pro-climate supporters are potentially more likely to prioritize climate action as a policy end, and thus be thankful for any type of climate policy that can be enacted. Second, the obverse to the above patterns is that pro-climate individuals tend to be more left-wing, and thus are more comfortable with government intervention in markets. Thus, although green industrial policy may have genuine criticisms in terms of design and implementation, from a public opinion perspective it may be highly sustainable.

### 3 Data and Methods

We fielded a pre-registered online survey experiment to test the effect of providing cues about economic competition on support for pro-climate policies. The survey was conducted on an overall sample of 2,337 American adults in the spring of 2024. The results were gathered via Lucid Theorem, which included quota sampling on age, gender, race, and geographic region.<sup>2</sup>

We focus on Americans because the United States is both a historically large emitter of carbon and plays an out-sized role in the global economy (Barrett 2003). Furthermore, the Inflation Reduction Act of August 2022 is one of the most representative examples of green industrial policy. It was designed to attract climate opponents into its coalition (Newell 2022), but has been highly politicized by opponents of the Biden administration. Understanding how Americans feel about green industrial policy without specifically cuing on this legislation should provide an important sense of how individuals perceive the initiative.

To test our hypotheses, we conducted two survey experiments, first a vignette and then a conjoint both embedded within the same survey. The vignette allows us to test the effect of competition narrowly, while the conjoint generalizes the results to a broader set of policy dimensions. The entire sample responded to both experiments.

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2. See Coppock and McClellan (2019) for discussion of the validity of social science research conducted via online samples like Lucid. See also Section A.2 for additional information about Lucid.



## 4 Study 1: Vignette Experiment

We begin by describing our vignette experiment and results. In the vignette we focus explicitly on corporate tax credits. Given that green industrial policy signifies a broad array of potential mechanisms, drilling down onto one policy over which we have previous research helps focus the study onto existing knowledge. We know from prior research that corporate tax incentives are popular amongst individuals, even if their understanding of how they work is limited (Jensen and Malesky 2018). This suggests that individuals have a developed mental model regarding corporate tax credits in general, whereas they may have more limited expectations about other green industrial policies such as loan guarantees and green national banks. It also allows us to benchmark findings to explore if the explicitly social goal of clean energy tax incentives attenuates pre-existing high support for corporate tax incentives for generic investment activity (Jensen, Malesky, and Walsh 2015). Finally, corporate tax credits are one of the most important policy tools used in green industrial policy, as evidenced by them making up the grand majority of the Inflation Reduction Act’s spending (Badlam et al. 2022).

We also root the vignette in a single industry: automobile manufacturing. We do this in part to ensure that we anchor respondent expectations about the policy, given that industrial policy narrowly targeted. Automobile manufacturing is also highly salient for respondents in the United States, both because of its traditional association with American economic well-being and because of the industry’s power to influence policy. Furthermore, electric vehicle manufacturing is one of the more salient dimensions of international economic competition, as exemplified by the rise of Chinese exports as a result of the government’s industrial policy (Lew 2023). Thus, this should be a sector of relevance to individual beliefs and an accurate policy for which both climate and competition matter.

Prior to treatment, all respondents answered a series of questions to measure their partisanship affiliation, economic ideology, existing level of climate preferences, and degree of nationalism, along with a series of demographic questions and additional controls. Respondents then read a preamble about a hypothetical policy involving corporate tax credits to create manufacturing jobs in the United States, which American policymakers were considering passing into law, and asked to evaluate the policy.<sup>3</sup>

After the preamble, the vignette was randomized in a 2x2 factorial design. Our factorial experimental design is summarized in Figure 1. Respondents viewed one of four possible vignettes concerning the hypothetical tax policy.<sup>4</sup> The *Tax Credit* treatment arm randomly presents respondents with information on either a clean energy tax incentive to automobile manufacturers (the “Green Energy” treatment) or generic business tax incentive to automo-


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3. The preamble differed slightly depending on which tax credit condition (green energy or business) the respondents were randomly assigned into. See Section A.3 for wording.

4. The full text of the vignettes is listed in Section A.3

bile manufacturers (the “Business” treatment).

The *Competition* treatment arm randomized between a cue presenting either information emphasizing the importance of tax (green if they had been sorted into the “Green Energy” condition, or generic business if they had been sorted into the “Business” condition) competition to strengthen American business against Chinese businesses (“China Competition” treatment), or a neutral condition with no additional information (“Control” condition).



**FIGURE 1.** *Factorial Experimental design*

The factorial design allows us to explore the effect of the China competition cue for each of our two issue areas of interest. This is vital, as we expect that the “Green Energy” condition will be punished by climate skeptics. We can compare the treatment effect of “China Competition” within the “Green Energy” arm against the same effect in the “Business” arm to determine if competition increases support for a climate policy, even amongst people who would otherwise not support the policy. An example of the manipulation (in this case, “Green Energy” and “China Competition”) presented to respondents is shown in Figure 2.

U.S. policymakers are debating ways of encouraging the creation of new manufacturing jobs in the United States.

To help create new manufacturing jobs that are also environmentally-friendly, some American policymakers have proposed providing **clean energy tax credits** to automobile manufacturers. The green tax credits would make it cheaper for those businesses to produce electric vehicles in the U.S. and would support the clean energy transition.

Additionally, the Chinese government is **competing with the United States** to attract environmentally-friendly investments. The proposed clean energy tax credits would make it more attractive for companies to invest in the United States rather than China.

**FIGURE 2.** *An example of how respondents learned about the fictional policy.*

After viewing the vignette, respondents were asked the extent to which they supported the proposed policy on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 7 (Strongly support), along with comprehension checks designed to measure the effectiveness of the treatment.<sup>5</sup> Respondents were also asked a series of questions designed to explore possible mechanisms underpinning the effect of the manipulation on their support for the policy. These include answering how the policy would improve the state of the U.S. economy overall, how the policy would help address the impacts of climate change, and an open ended response question prompting them to reflect on why they either supported or opposed the policy.

## 4.1 Average Effect of Competition Framing

To investigate **H1** we ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) model regressing support for tax policy on the *Tax Credit* treatment interacted with the *Competition* treatment.<sup>6</sup> As a reminder, each respondent was randomly assigned to one of two *Tax Credit* conditions: “Green Energy” which proposes providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers, and “Business”, which proposes providing generic tax credits to automobile manufacturers. Respondents were then independently assigned to one of two *Competition* conditions: “China Competition”, which included additional information emphasizing that Chinese businesses are competition with U.S. companies, and “Control”, which provided no additional cue.

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5. The wording of the dependent variable question is in the appendix and responses to the comprehension check are shown in Section A.3. 88.4% of respondents sorted into the China competition condition correctly identified China from a list of countries in competition with the U.S. to attract investment. 79% of respondents randomized into the clean energy tax credit condition correctly identified the purpose of the proposed tax credits, and 64% of those in the business condition did the same.

6. We also ran the main model of interest as ordered probit models, the results are similar and shown in Table A14.


The benefit of a factorial design is that while we can investigate the average treatment effect (ATE) of each of our treatments, we can drill down on the cause of respondent outcomes more effectively by estimating the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) of one treatment holding the other treatment constant. To test **H1**, we are particularly interested in two CATEs: the effect of “China Competition” given the other treatment is “Green Energy”, and the effect of “China Competition” given “Business”. If our hypothesis is correct, we should find that support for the treatment of “China Competition” increases the support for “Green Energy” tax credits. We can then compare this result to the CATE of “China Competition” conditional on “Business” tax credits to compare the magnitude of the effect to a policy with a purely economic rationale, to determine if the green motivation dilutes the effect.

In Figure 3, we present the marginal and substantive effects with 95% confidence interval of both CATEs of interest. On average, support for the policy is relatively high, which fits with extant literature on opinions regarding corporate tax credits — in all four treatment arms, the average support well above the outcome median of 4. Even given that high level of support, we observe positive and statistically significant treatment effects. As expected in **H1**, compared to the pure Tax Credits condition with no cues, support for the green energy tax policy is higher among those exposed to the additional information of *China Competition* (0.35,  $p < 0.000$ ). This remains true for respondents in the Business condition: support for tax credits are higher for respondents who received the additional competition cue (0.37,  $p < 0.000$ ). Notably, there was no difference between the two CATEs ( $p = 0.893$ ), suggesting that competition drives support for the tax credit policy regardless of the stated social goal.

Moreover, this increase in support is substantively large. For those in the *Green Energy* condition, respondents in the *China Competition* arm supported the policy by an increased 10.14 percentage points (95% CI: 4.46, 15.81).<sup>7</sup> Similarly among those in the *Business* condition, the additional information of the *China Competition* cue resulted in a 6.90 percentage point increase in support (95% CI: 1.23, 12.57).

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7. To report percentage changes in support we collapse the primary measure of support into a binary, with responses “Slightly support”, “Support” or “Strong support” coded as supporting the policy and all other responses as opposing.



**FIGURE 3.** *Effect of Competition Framing on Tax Policy Support*

For robustness, we use an alternative outcome measure regarding willingness to vote for a politician who supported the proposed policy. This outcome is in line with extant work on corporate tax credits, namely Jensen et al. (2014), and allows us to ensure these results are not purely a result of question framing. We find substantively and statistically similar results, reported in A7. On average, then, we find strong support for **H1**: individuals much prefer climate policies when they are primed to think of them as in economic competition with China. The effect is essentially the same as for purely economic competition, suggesting there is no punishment from respondents for the social goal for the corporate tax credits.

Furthermore, we analyzed open-ended responses of respondents explaining their logic using structural topic models. These models suggest that the *China Competition* treatment moved perceptions of how the *Green Energy* treatment would affect the U.S. economy. In particular, respondents in the green competition treatment arm were much more likely to

mention American jobs and less likely to express skepticism about electric vehicles.<sup>8</sup>

Overall, we find support for the idea that the *China Competition* treatment successfully cued respondents to consider the impact of green tax credits on the U.S. economy, and American jobs, while not significantly altering perceptions of the effectiveness of green tax incentives in combating the effects of climate change. This finding is perhaps critical when considering the next set of findings, results by partisanship. If those ex-ante opposed to climate action view climate tax policy framed as competition with China as improving the U.S. economy, but not explicitly helping address the impact of climate change climate, tax policy may reach an audience of those who were predisposed to oppose climate action. This is exactly what we find.

## 4.2 Effect of Cues on climate skeptics

### 4.2.1 Treatment effects by partisanship

Next, we turn to exploring heterogeneous treatment effects by climate opposition (**H2**). Recall that our expectations were that emphasizing economic competition would lead to a larger increase in support for climate tax policy among those who were ex-ante less likely to support climate action than those who were. Specifically, in the United States climate opposition comes from conservative individuals and there are consistently huge gaps in partisan approaches in climate change. Thus, we first examine treatment effects by party affiliation.

In Figure 4 we report results broken down by partisanship.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, because several respondent features may be endogenous to both partisan affiliation and their support for the corporate tax credits policy, we include a standard set of demographic control variables (gender, race, education, income, employment status, age, and region) in the model.<sup>10</sup>

We find strong support for **H2**. For face validity of partisanship as a proxy for climate opposition, we find that Republicans punish “Green Energy” tax credits without a competition cue. Yet the CATE for “China Competition” conditional on “Green Energy” is the largest (0.49, p.value=0.001) among self-identified Republicans. Notably, framing green energy tax credits along side Chinese competition serves to narrow the partisan preference gap without reducing support among Democratic respondents.<sup>11</sup>

Additionally, the added effect of cuing “Chinese Competition” with generic “Business” tax credits among Republicans was 0.49 (p=0.001), which suggests a similar effect size of the Chinese competition regardless of the type of tax credit. It is particularly worth noting that


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8. See Appendix Section A.4.2.

9. Here and throughout, we analyze both self-identified partisans and leaners. Results are similar if we exclude leaners; these results appear in Table A11.

10. All covariates were measured pre-treatment, per Sheagley and Clifford 2023.

11. As anticipated, while the estimated effect of *Green Energy and China Competition* among Democratic respondents is positive it is substantively smaller and statistically insignificant (0.19, p=0.18).



**FIGURE 4.** *Effect of Cues on Policy Support: By Party Affiliation*

Republican support for “Business” tax credits without the competition cue and for “Green Energy” tax credits with the competition cue are statistically indistinguishable from each other (4.3 compared to 4.23).

These effects are substantively large and meaningful. The percentage of Republicans supporting green energy tax incentives was 15.5 percentage points (95% CI: 7.18, 23.7) higher in the “China Competition” condition. Crucially, among Republican respondents the mean support for climate tax incentives framed in terms of international competition with China was over the midpoint of 4 (neither support nor oppose), meaning competition framing moved the mean green energy tax approval for Republicans from slightly opposing to indifferent. In fact, using the same binary approval measure, 53.8% of Republicans approved of the policy when it was framed in terms of international competition (compared to 38.4% without the competition cue). This increase, and the lack of corresponding decrease among

Democrats (support for the climate tax policy was a statistically insignificant 3.16 percentage points higher among Democrats), results in a sizable 12.3 percentage point ( $p=0.04$ ) narrowing of the partisan preference gap in approval for green energy tax incentives. We take this as evidence in favor of **H2**.

#### 4.2.2 Effects by climate preferences

Next, we consider the effects of treatment by respondents’ pre-treatment climate preferences directly. In Table 1, we list four questions respondents were asked prior to treatment, which together were designed to measure the degree to which they favor action to address climate change.<sup>12</sup>

**TABLE 1.** *Climate Index Questions: “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about climate change.”*

Wording
Climate change is a serious problem.
The international community should do more to reduce climate change.
I would personally support investment in green initiatives to address the effects of climate change.
Investment in green initiatives to address the effects of climate change positively affects my profession.

We then constructed a climate index score by coding each response to the questions from 1 to 7 in 1 point increments (where 4 is neutral) then summing and dividing the total by 4 (the number of questions) to make a scale with ranging from 1 (minimum climate action support) to 7 (maximum climate action support). The median climate score across respondents was 5.<sup>13</sup>


We then interact the *Competition* treatment with a variable indicating if the respondent scores above or below the median value on the climate index scale, along with demographic covariates. The results in Figure 5 follow expectations (**H2**). For respondents who reported below-median level of climate preferences (climate skeptics), the “China Competition” cue significantly shifted their support for climate-change mitigation spending (0.51,  $p < 0.000$ ).

12. To investigate how the item performed and if they created a valid scale, we use confirmatory factor analysis. Table A2 displays parameter estimates and model fit information using scaled outputs indicating that the climate items capture the underlying concept of climate preferences well. Additionally the the Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  is 0.87 suggesting high internal consistency of the scale.

13. While there is a sizable correlation between respondent’s climate score and identifying as a Republican (-0.44), there is certainly a degree of variation: 24.8% of Republicans (243 respondents) are above the median climate index score, and 33% of Democrats (326) are below the median.



Again, in line with our expectations, respondents with an above-median level of climate concern and desire for climate action did not respond to the “China Competition” cue by significantly increasing their support for the green tax incentive (0.23, p.value=0.09).



**FIGURE 5.** *Effect of Cues on Policy Support: By Pre-Treatment Climate Views*

Next, we consider the final question in the index in isolation. This question asked respondents to consider if they believe that investment in green incentives positively affects their profession. We dichotomize responses to this question into those who believe that green investment either positively or negatively impacts their profession (dropping respondents who were neutral). As before our expectation is that emphasizing international competition would be effective at increasing support for clean energy tax incentives *particularly* among those who had negative ex-ante views on climate incentives. In this case, this should be an especially difficult test — these are individuals who believe they will be negatively materi-

ally affected by green investment, which has been an indicator in prior research of significant climate opposition (Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022).

We continue to find support for **H2**. Among respondents who believed green investments “negatively” impact their profession, emphasizing international competition had a 0.69 ( $p < 0.000$ ) increase in support for clean energy tax incentives, compared to the same group not exposed to the information. As before, the pro-climate group (in this case those who pre-treatment believed investment in green incentives positively affected their profession) had a smaller and statistically insignificant increase in support (0.31,  $p = 0.07$ ) in response to the “China Competition” cue.<sup>14</sup>

### 4.3 Summary of Vignette Results

In summation, we find consistent support for both hypotheses. Respondents reacted to our manipulation emphasizing economic competition with China by increasing their support for both business tax incentives and tax incentives explicitly intended for clean energy investment. Additionally, respondents who we anticipated ex-ante would hold less pro-climate views (including Republicans and those less concerned about the effects of climate change) reacted most positively to treatment. Notably, this positive response was *not* offset by a negative response among those with strong pro-climate views (Democrats and those more concerned about the climate crisis). Taken together our results suggest emphasizing economic competition may help to build a lasting coalition for climate policy.

## 5 Study 2: Conjoint Experiment

With the vignette experiment we established that the American public, regardless of ideological opposition to climate policy, broadly supports green corporate tax incentives when primed to consider economic competition with China. This first experiment anchors a number of features that are likely to be more complex in reality, including available policy alternatives, competitor countries, and domestic industry. Additionally, the vignette starts from a point of an economic policy (tax incentives) and then moves into utilizing economic policy to achieve climate policy adaptation objectives. Again, in the real world, the government may set the goal of achieving climate action and then explore a variety of policy avenues.

To assess the generalizability of these treatment effects beyond the specific policy area studied in the vignette, we turn to our second experiment conducted on the same sample, a conjoint. The conjoint lets us vary other aspects that look like the practical suite of climate policy options. While this doesn’t cover the full gamut of the potential levers under green industrial policy, it does allow us to take a broader look at individuals’ preferences over de-

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14. See fig. A4 for a visualization of the effect.

grees of market intervention. Furthermore, we start from point of climate policies to see if, when given that anchor and cue, similar trends as in the vignette emerge.

Respondents were presented with two paired hypothetical climate policies six times; for each pair, respondents were asked which they would prefer to see passed into law.<sup>15</sup> Respondents were also asked whether they would support or oppose each individual policy on its own. Prior to viewing the comparisons all respondents saw the following preamble:

“As you may have heard, American policymakers are currently considering various policies to **address the effects of climate change**. We will now provide you with several hypothetical government policies which are intended to **accelerate the green energy transition**.”

In this way, we clearly anchored the policy as climate action. Looking at the average effect of each attribute on respondents willingness to support the policy should help indicate the extent to which features of climate policy are linked to public preferences over climate action, even in the presence of alternative considerations. The policies randomly displayed the following dimensions for several attributes of interest.<sup>16</sup>

The dimensions for each attribute are displayed in Table 2.

## 5.1 Results from Conjoint Experiment

The baseline results for the conjoint experiment are reported in Figure 6. We find support for market distortion and green industrial policy. In terms of policy tool employed to address the impacts of climate change and accelerate the green energy transition we find strong support for tax credits to consumers. Relative to the baseline of direct government spending, tax credits for consumers increased the preference for the climate policy by 11.2 ( $p < 0.000$ ) percentage points. Notably, tax credits for corporations, the policy described in our vignette was less popular than direct government spending but the difference was not statistically significant (-1.20 percentage points  $p = 0.18$ ). Respondents were least supportive of increased government regulation (-1.90 percentage points  $p = 0.028$ ) which likely was associated with mitigation efforts rather than adaptation.

Next, we turn to exploring the hypothetical domestic and international effects of climate action. We anchored the domestic effects by repeating information from the vignette that the policy would “help slow down the domestic effects of climate change”. We find that compared to that baseline, respondents preferred policies that had the domestic effect of creating clean energy jobs (3.88 percentage points increase  $p < 0.000$ ). Additionally, respondents preferred the baseline of slowing down climate change to policies that would either encourage foreign investment in the US (-5.72 percentage points  $p < 0.000$ ) or increase the cost of fossil fuel compared to renewables (-11.28 percentage points  $p < 0.000$ ).

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15. The six comparisons, asked to each respondent, gives us a total of 13,983 to analyze.


16. We coded the conjoint so that the Policy Tool Dimension was always the first displayed.

Attribute	Dimensions
Policy Tool	Tax credits for corporations Tax credits for consumers Direct government spending Increased government regulation
Industry Target	Manufacturing Energy Agriculture
Domestic Effects	Create a substantial number of clean energy jobs Increase the cost of fossil fuel compared to renewable energy Encourage foreign investment into the country Help slow down the domestic effects of climate change
International Effects	Promote U.S. national interest by deepening collaboration and cooperation with other countries Advance U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries Help slow down the global effects of climate change
Government Spending	\$100 billion \$200 billion \$400 billion \$600 billion
Partisan Support	Endorsed by Democrats and some Republicans Endorsed by Democrats

**TABLE 2.** *Conjoint Attributes and Dimensions*

For the international effects we again anchored the policy as slowing down climate change in this case the “global effects of climate change”. Compared to the baseline, respondents opposed both policies that “advance U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries” (-3.15 percentage points  $p < 0.000$ ) and “promote U.S. national interest by deepening collaboration and cooperation with other countries” (-2.33 percentage points  $p = 0.002$ ). Compared to our finding in the vignette that emphasizing competition with China results in a large increase in support, the negative finding on the generic competition emphasises may suggest that generic competition is less salient than competition with a perceived rival of the U.S.. Additionally, here we are comparing the competition prime to information about the pro-climate effects of the policy (our baseline), which may suggest the average respondent is more concerned with perceived effectiveness of a climate policy achieving the goal of reducing the effects of climate change compared to explicitly benefiting the

U.S.. Here, however, as in the vignette we uncovered important partisan differences that we turn to in the heterogeneous effects section.




**FIGURE 6.** *Baseline conjoint results on climate policy preferences (ACME).*

On the whole, these results suggest that particular kinds of market interventions are especially popular. Though among the overall pool of respondents competition is not popular, unlike our expectation in **H1**, it is notable that it is not distinguishable from cooperation, which has a long history of being valued in climate policy (Bechtel, Scheve, and van Lieshout 2022b). Furthermore, market correcting policies — such as increased government regulation and increasing the cost of fossil fuel — are significantly less popular than market interventions like offering individual tax credits and creating jobs. Thus, this supports the notion that government intervention is more popular overall.

## 5.2 Heterogeneous Results by Partisanship

We now turn to heterogeneous effects beginning with partisanship. In Figure 7 we follow Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley (2020) which recommends plotting marginal means to demonstrate heterogeneous effects in conjoint experiments, where the predicted mean for each subgroup is 0.5 by design and do not rely on a reference level (as in the AMCE results). We visualize the differences between Republican and Democratic respondents directly. Positive values indicate Republicans preferred the attribute and negative that Democratic respondents did.<sup>17</sup>

Breaking down the results by partisanship reveals several key differences. Crucially, as hypothesized in **H2** the effect of competition framing is strongest among Republicans. Among Republican respondents climate policies that “advance U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries” have an estimated MM of 0.52 (95% CI:0.51 0.534). Thus, competition is viewed most positively by climate opponents which, given the AMCE without heterogeneous effects, puts them at odds with climate supporters.



**FIGURE 7.** Differences in Marginal Means: Republican and Democratic Respondents

17. See Section A.5 for a plot of overall marginal means by partisanship.

There is a 5.88 percentage point difference between Republican and Democratic marginal means within the international competition level ( $p < 0.000$ ). Again this result is in line with **H2** and is similar to the results in our vignette experiment. Republicans prefer climate policy that emphasizes international competition. On the other hand, we observe a 6.33 percentage point difference between Republican and Democratic support for a policy with the international effect of slowing down climate change, with Democratic respondents preferring this attribute.


This partisan divergence helps explain the negative result in Figure 6. Respondents from the two parties clearly diverge in terms of desired international effects. In fact, the distance between Republicans and Democratic respondents for international competition is the second largest, behind only the bipartisanship attribute for partisan support (7.79 percentage points  $p < 0.000$ ).

We see similar, but less dramatic, results for the domestic effects attribute. There is a 3.81 percentage point distance between Republican and Democratic marginal means within the encourage foreign investment attribute. Additionally, within the policy tool dimension we see variation across party. We observe a 4.80 percentage point distance between Republican and Democratic marginal means in support for tax credits for corporations and a 4.01 percentage point distance between their marginal means in the increased government regular attribute. Overall, Republicans prefer climate policy utilizing tax credits for corporations ( $p < 0.000$ ) and Democrats preferred increased government climate regulation ( $p < 0.000$ ).

Next in Figure 8 we explore the results of the conjoint by pre-treatment climate views again coded as a binary based on if the respondent's answers to the pre-treatment climate battery were above or below the median score.<sup>18</sup>

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18. See Section A.5 for overall marginal means by pre-treatment climate views.



**FIGURE 8.** *Differences in Marginal Means: By Pre-Treatment Climate Views*

Here we find similar results as in Figure 7. Respondents who scored lower on our climate battery preferred climate policy emphasizing economic competition with other countries with a 5.32 percentage point difference between respondents with below median responses and those with above ( $p < 0.000$ ). Additionally, below median respondents were more likely to support policies that encourage foreign investment into the U.S., and less likely compared to respondents with above median climate views to prefer policies that generally help slow down the effects of climate change. Finally, below median climate scoring respondents were 3.95 percentage points more likely to prefer tax credits for corporations (our tool in the vignette), than were those with above median climate scores ( $p < 0.000$ ).

### 5.3 Summary of Conjoint Results

As in the vignette results we find strong support for **H2**. While the entire respondent pool preferred climate policies emphasizing the pro-climate effects, Republicans were more supportive of climate policy with the effect of privileging U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries. Additionally, we uncover important partisan differences in terms of type of policy tool, desired domestic effects, and partisan support.



Furthermore, while we don't find support for **H1** on economic competition specifically, we do find that market interventions are consistently more popular on average than are market correcting policies. These results provide important context to our vignette findings and reinforce the potential for economic competition framing to increase support for climate action among climate opponents, as well as for market intervention more broadly to be a base from which to build a sustainable climate coalition.

## 6 Discussion

Green industrial policy has become central to decarbonization, but remains a relatively new paradigm for political leaders. We know that it helps policymakers create interest group coalitions, but in order to make a genuine difference in the fight against climate change, it also has to be supported by electorates. Given the potential for future right-wing leaders to roll back climate initiatives, this will require winning over climate skeptics.

This is not an idle speculation — the American IRA is the largest green investment on record, but faces opposition from high-profile Republicans who view climate policy as politically profitable to attack. Democrats have responded by framing the IRA as good for the economy, and particularly have pitched it in terms of economic competition.<sup>19</sup> Our study set out to explore if this type of framing of green industrial policy, emphasizing international competition, increases public support for green industrial policy.

Using a vignette experiment, we find a broad base of support for green industrial policy among the American public. More pertinently, we find that priming respondents to think about economic competition makes them more supportive of climate policy. The increase in support is most notable among respondents who ex-ante did not favor climate action, including Republicans. Crucially, this increase in support was *not* offset by a decrease in support from those who ex-ante favored climate action. We additionally generalize the majority of results with a conjoint experiment that randomizes more policy components. Here, although we find important partisan differences, we see broad support for climate policy that emphasizes job creation and bipartisanship. Notably, here we do see somewhat of a penalty for climate policy emphasizing economic competition over purely positive climate effects, suggesting perhaps that competition with China is particularly salient.

Taken together our results have important implications for policymakers seeking to enact meaningful climate action that citizens will approve of. We find strong support for green industrial policy among members of the American public. Respondents consistently favored providing tax credits to consumers (in the conjoint), and corporations (in the vignette), in

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19. See for example Joe Manchin stating “Manufacturing is meant to bring manufacturing back to the United States. It’s not basically allowing everyone to put all the parts and build everything you can for that battery somewhere else and then send it here for assembly” (Shepardson 2023).

order to advance the goal of the green transition. This suggests that green subsidies can reduce opposition to climate spending and help build a broader coalition of support. This is particularly the case when green industrial policy is framed as a tool to increase the foreign competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers.

However, this finding should not be confused with an enthusiastic endorsement of the competition framing. It is far from clear that inciting respondents to support climate policy by leaning on jingoistic economic nationalism is costless. Even if passing climate policy is a problem of domestic political economy, the climate itself remains a public good. On the one hand, it may be the case that competition between economic powers spurs faster technological development which can enable quicker decarbonization (Mathiesen and Colman 2022). On the other hand, severing global supply chains and decimating international research networks could strangle innovation that feeds on collaborative partnerships.

It is also likely that economic competition for green technology will be linked with broader international competition. Most international rules of trade and finance explicitly disavow market distortions. Pursuing green industrial policy at the expense of other countries could contribute to a beggar-thy-neighbor approach to international political economy more generally, and thus degrade long-held norms that have enabled much international cooperation. Indeed, the IRA has already generated fears about new forms of international competition between the United States, the European Union (Mathis 2022), and China (Mathiesen and Colman 2022).

Future research into public opinion of green industrial policy can build on our work and evaluate the overall benefits of market distortion to promote decarbonization. As noted, our results portend something of a tension between increased support for climate policy emphasizing international competition (particularly with China) and the reality that to address the global impacts of the climate crisis will truly take global cooperation. Understanding this interplay is critical to more fully understanding public opinion concerning green industrial policy.

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## A Survey information

### A.1 Survey information

#### A.1.1 Research ethics statement

The human subject research in this study was reviewed and determined to be exempt from further review by the [AUTHOR’S] institutional review board (23-3117) and adheres to the APSA’s Principles and Guidance on Human Subject Research. Lucid recruited participants through an online opt-in model. Respondents were required to give their voluntary and informed consent after being provided with a description of the survey and prior to beginning the survey. Additionally, respondents were compensated by Lucid for the approximately 10 minute survey, at a level determined by Lucid to be commensurate with the standards of other survey providers. The study did not specifically target any vulnerable groups, represent any undo risk to respondents, or utilize deception.

### A.2 Use of online convenience samples in social science research

We rely on an online convenience sample provided by Lucid in this paper. The Lucid sample includes quotas on age, gender, race, ethnicity, and geographic region.<sup>20</sup> Lucid has been


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20. Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that lucid samples match the American National Election Study on a number of key demographic benchmarks.

widely used in political science and the social sciences in general. Recent work in, for example, the *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Behavior*, and *Political Analysis* relies on samples drawn from Lucid (Clayton et al. 2023; Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022; Munis 2022; Simonovits, McCoy, and Littvay 2022; Zhirkov 2022).

Additionally, we began our survey with a captcha designed to remove bot responses and screened out respondents with two simple attention checks designed to remove respondents who are clearly not paying attention to the survey. This is in keeping with best practices for surveys relying on Lucid samples (Clayton et al. 2023; Peyton, Huber, and Coppock 2022; Ternovski and Orr 2022). The wording of the captcha and the attention check questions is below:

Before you proceed to the survey,  
please complete the Captcha  
below.



**FIGURE A1.** *Pre-Survey Captcha*

Instructive attention check (1): Please choose “somewhat agree” for this question. (Strongly disagree / Somewhat disagree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat agree / Strongly agree)

87.72% of respondents correctly answered “somewhat agree” and continued with the survey.

Instructive attention check (2): People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. **We are testing whether people read questions.** To show that you’ve read this much, answer “Very interested”. (Extremely interested / Very interested / Moderately interested / Slightly interested / Not interested at all)

96.05% of respondents correctly answered “Very interested” and continued on with the survey.

## A.3 Survey instrument

### A.3.1 Treatment wording

Respondents viewed a common preamble reading:

In the next section, we will present you with information about a hypothetical policy debate. These are general scenarios about policies the United States may consider enacting in the future. They are not about any specific policies you may have heard about in the news. Please read the details of the policy carefully, afterwards we will ask for your opinion regarding the policy.

After the preamble, respondents viewed one of four different treatment conditions concerning the hypothetical policy before evaluating the policy

- **Green X Competition:** U.S. policymakers are debating ways of encouraging the creation of new manufacturing jobs in the United States.

To help create new manufacturing jobs that are also environmentally-friendly, some American policymakers have proposed providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers. The green tax credits would make it cheaper for those businesses to produce electric vehicles in the U.S. and would support the clean energy transition.

Additionally, the Chinese government is competing with the United States to attract environmentally-friendly investments. The proposed clean energy tax credits would make it more attractive for companies to invest in the United States rather than China.

- **Green X Control:** U.S. policymakers are debating ways of encouraging the creation of new manufacturing jobs in the United States.

To help create new manufacturing jobs that are also environmentally-friendly, some American policymakers have proposed providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers. The green tax credits would make it cheaper for those businesses to produce electric vehicles in the U.S. and would support the clean energy transition.

- **Business X Competition:** U.S. policymakers are debating ways of encouraging the creation of new manufacturing jobs in the United States.

To help create new manufacturing jobs, some American policymakers have proposed providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers. The tax credits would make it cheaper for these businesses to produce vehicles in the U.S. and would support American innovation.

Additionally, the Chinese government is competing with the United States to attract investments. The proposed tax credits would make it more attractive for companies to invest in the United States rather than China.

- **Business X Control:** U.S. policymakers are debating ways of encouraging the creation of new manufacturing jobs in the United States.

To help create new manufacturing jobs, some American policymakers have proposed providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers. The tax credits would make it cheaper for these businesses to produce vehicles in the U.S. and would support American innovation.

### A.3.2 Evaluation wording

- **DV:** To what extent would you support [providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers]?
  - Strongly support (7)
  - Support (6)
  - Slightly support (5)
  - Neither support nor oppose (4)
  - Slightly oppose (3)
  - Oppose (2)
  - Strongly oppose (1)
- **Open:** Briefly, could you tell us why you feel the way you do about [providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers]?
- **DV:Econ:** To what extent do you think the proposed policy of [providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers] improves the overall condition of the U.S. economy?
  - Significantly improves (7)
  - Improves (6)
  - Slightly improves (5)
  - No change (4)
  - Slightly worsens (3)
  - Worsens (2)
  - Significantly worsens (1)
- **DV:Climate:** To what extent do you believe the proposed policy of [providing clean energy tax credits to automobile manufacturers providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers] addresses the negative impacts of climate change?
  - Very effectively (7)
  - Effectively (6)

- Somewhat effectively (5)
  - Neutral (4)
  - Somewhat ineffectively (3)
  - Ineffectively (2)
  - Very ineffectively (1)
- **Compcheck1:** In the scenario you read above, the government of which country is competing with the United States to attract investments?
    - Japan (0)
    - China (1)
    - Germany (0)
    - Australia (0)
  - **Compcheck2:** In the policy shown above, what was the primary reason why American policymakers were considering providing tax credits to automobile manufacturers??
    - To support American innovation (1)
    - To support the clean energy transition (1)
    - To help workers with children (0)

## A.4 Additional analysis

### A.4.1 Demographic Balance



**TABLE A1. Demographic Balance Table**


		Business (N=1169)		Green (N=1168)	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
white		0.7	0.4	0.7	0.5
Nationalism		4.3	1.4	4.4	1.3
		N	Pct.	N	Pct.
competition	control	582	49.8	591	50.6
	treatment	587	50.2	577	49.4
gender	Female	588	50.3	601	51.5
	Male	563	48.2	558	47.8
educ	Associate's Degree	171	14.6	141	12.1
	Advanced Degree	129	11.0	138	11.8
	Bachelor's Degree	292	25.0	287	24.6
	Some college	261	22.3	282	24.1
	High school graduate	286	24.5	288	24.7
	Less than high school	30	2.6	31	2.7
empstat	Disabled	78	6.7	74	6.3
	Employed full time	509	43.5	533	45.6
	Employed part time	152	13.0	144	12.3
	Retired	221	18.9	226	19.3
	Student	41	3.5	37	3.2
	Unemployed looking for work	118	10.1	105	9.0
	Unemployed not looking for work	50	4.3	49	4.2
age_bins	18 - 24	119	10.2	136	11.6
	25 - 34	222	19.0	214	18.3
	35 - 44	236	20.2	218	18.7
	45 - 54	184	15.7	195	16.7
	55 - 64	215	18.4	202	17.3
	65 - 74	151	12.9	151	12.9
	75 or older	42	3.6	52	4.5
partyID	Independent	304	26.0	273	23.4
	Democrat	398	34.0	397	34.0
	Republican	379	32.4	411	35.2
	No preference	82	7.0	67	5.7
	Other	6	0.5	20	1.7
social_ideo_3	Haven't thought much	63	5.4	64	5.5
	Moderate	347	29.7	304	26.0
	Liberal	386	33.0	386	33.0
	Conservative	373	31.9	414	35.4
econ_ideo_3	Haven't thought much	61	5.2	65	5.6
	Moderate	319	27.3	296	25.3
	Liberal	350	29.9	338	28.9
	Conservative	439	37.6	469	40.2
region	Midwest	216	18.5	225	19.3
	Northeast	247	21.1	226	19.3
	South	438	37.5	466	39.9
	West	250	21.4	242	20.7
climate_bin_median	Climate_high	548	46.9	504	43.2
	Climate_low	620	53.0	664	56.8

### A.4.2 STM

In this section we conduct analysis of the open ended response question, confirming that our treatment moved perceptions of how the tax credits would influence the US economy and overall cued respondents to consider jobs and environmental impacts explicitly. We utilize Structural Topic Modeling (STM) in order to use agreement covariates to make direct inferences about the text.

Below we include an equation explaining the STM modeling approach. The benefits of the STM can be summarized as follows “the Structural Topic Model’s key innovation is that it permits users to incorporate arbitrary metadata, defined as information about each document, into the topic model” (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2019, 2). The STM allows the researcher to establish for a given document  $i$  and given topic  $k$ , what is the probability of a given word  $v$  as a function of a function of the level of covariates ( $y$ ).

$$\beta \propto \exp \left( m_v + \kappa_{k,v}^{(t)} + \kappa_{y_d,v}^{(c)} + \kappa_{y_d,k,v}^{(i)} \right) \quad (1)$$




**FIGURE A2.** *Effect of Cues on Topic Proportion*

In Figure A2, we plot the topic frequency as a function of treatment condition assignment. We find that compared to those exposed to information about generic business tax credits, respondents cued with information about clean tax credits were more likely to discuss topics defined as “Clean Energy”, “EV Development”, “EV Skepticism” and less likely to discuss topics associated with “American Jobs”. Additionally, when we add in the China

competition cue those in the green energy condition were statistically more likely to write about “American Jobs” influencing their rationale for either opposing or supporting the climate policy.

## A.5 Additional results




**FIGURE A3.** *Overall effects graphic from fully interacted model*

**TABLE A2.** *Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Climate Index Items*

Item	Loading	Std. Error
Climate change serious	0.920	0.005
Climate change international	0.891	0.005
Climate change investment	0.888	0.005
Climate change profession	0.589	0.013
Comparative Fit Index	0.997	
SRMR	0.020	


**NOTE:** Confirmatory factor analysis of the questions used to create our index of climate concern. The standardized factor loadings indicate that each of the climate questions contributed to the scale. The fit indices demonstrate that our conceptualizing of the scale as a single latent dimension fits the data well (Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >0.95; standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) <0.08).



Investment in green initiatives to address the effects of climate change affects my profession... —●— Negatively —●— Positively


Support ranges from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).  
 Model controls for demographics.  
 Outer error bars: 95% CI, Inner error bars 83.4% CI.  
 Dashed line represents the midpoint of our scale.  
 N=1,496  
 The full results are shown in table form in Table A6.

**FIGURE A4.** *Effect of Cues on Policy Support: By Perception of Climate Spending on Profession*



**FIGURE A5. Marginal Means: Partisanship**





**FIGURE A6.** *Marginal Means: By Pre-Treatment Climate Views*

### A.5.1 Tables underlying results

TABLE A3. *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy*

	Baseline (1)	Controls included (2)
<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)		
Green	0.177* (0.096)	0.215** (0.089)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)		
China Competition	0.366*** (0.096)	0.357*** (0.090)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)		
Male		-0.168** (0.065)
Other		-0.032 (0.077)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)		0.319** (0.132)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree		0.190* (0.110)
Bachelor's degree		-0.056 (0.109)
Some college		-0.020 (0.111)
High school graduate		0.031 (0.218)
No high school		0.039 (0.090)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)		
\$30,000-\$59,999		-0.037 (0.099)
\$60,000-\$99,999		0.053 (0.124)
\$100,000-\$149,999		0.096 (0.144)
More than \$150,000		-0.379*** (0.145)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)		
Full time		-0.292* (0.159)
Part time		-0.181 (0.169)
Student		-0.504** (0.229)
Unemployed-looking		-0.385** (0.164)
Unemployed-not looking		-0.458** (0.202)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)		
25 - 34		0.204 (0.127)
35 - 44		0.340*** (0.129)
45 - 54		0.349** (0.137)
55 - 64		0.484*** (0.139)
65 - 74		0.226 (0.172)
75 or older		-0.112 (0.227)
<b>PID (inc. leaners)</b> (reference= Democrat)		
Republican		-0.126 (0.101)
No preference		-0.139 (0.104)
<b>Social Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		0.081 (0.218)
Liberal		0.240 (0.228)
Conservative		0.087 (0.230)
<b>Economic Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		-0.029 (0.218)
Liberal		-0.260 (0.229)
Conservative		0.027 (0.227)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast		0.010 (0.100)
South		-0.081 (0.089)
West		-0.094 (0.100)
<b>Climate concern index</b> (1-7)		0.413*** (0.025)
<b>Nationalism index</b> (1-7)		0.109*** (0.026)
<b>Interaction</b> (reference= Control—Business)		
Green—China Competition	-0.018 (0.136)	0.028 (0.126)
N	2,337	2,304
R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.186

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

TABLE A4. *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy: PartyID (leaners inc.)*

	Baseline (1)	Controls included (2)
<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)		
Green	0.865*** (0.145)	0.880*** (0.145)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)		
China Competition	0.351** (0.140)	0.365*** (0.141)
<b>PID (inc. leaners)</b> (reference= Democrat)		
Republican	-0.016 (0.144)	0.022 (0.145)
No preference	-0.239 (0.188)	-0.186 (0.188)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)		
Male		-0.222*** (0.067)
Other		-0.014 (0.080)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)		0.318** (0.137)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree		0.134 (0.114)
Bachelor's degree		-0.108 (0.113)
Some college		-0.107 (0.114)
High school graduate		-0.013 (0.226)
No high school		0.068 (0.093)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)		
\$30,000-\$59,999		-0.014 (0.102)
\$60,000-\$99,999		0.064 (0.129)
\$100,000-\$149,999		0.126 (0.149)
More than \$150,000		-0.350** (0.151)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)		
Full time		-0.372** (0.165)
Part time		-0.230 (0.176)
Student		-0.414* (0.237)
Unemployed-looking		-0.392** (0.171)
Unemployed-not looking		-0.592*** (0.209)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)		
25 - 34		0.204 (0.132)
35 - 44		0.395*** (0.134)
45 - 54		0.320** (0.140)
55 - 64		0.477*** (0.142)
65 - 74		0.242 (0.176)
75 or older		-0.041 (0.233)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast		0.041 (0.104)
South		-0.084 (0.092)
West		-0.026 (0.104)
<b>Interactions</b> (reference= Business, Democrat, Control)		
Green X Competition	-0.184 (0.202)	-0.172 (0.202)
Green X Republican	-1.408*** (0.203)	-1.435*** (0.204)
Green X No preference	-0.404 (0.268)	-0.410 (0.268)
Competition X Republican	0.133 (0.202)	0.122 (0.202)
Competition X No preference	-0.313 (0.272)	-0.300 (0.272)
Green X Competition X Republican	0.154 (0.286)	0.172 (0.286)
Green X Competition X No preference	0.457 (0.386)	0.495 (0.387)
N	2,337	2,309
R <sup>2</sup>	0.084	0.116

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

**TABLE A5.** *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy: Climate Index*

<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)	
Green	1.007*** (0.135)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)	
China Competition	0.469*** (0.133)
<b>Climate Index</b> (reference= Above Median)	
Below Median	-0.140 (0.129)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)	
Male	-0.194*** (0.066)
Other	-0.089 (0.076)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)	0.245* (0.134)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)	
Advanced Degree	0.186* (0.111)
Bachelor's degree	-0.077 (0.111)
Some college	-0.007 (0.112)
High school graduate	-0.005 (0.221)
No high school	0.072 (0.092)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)	
\$30,000-\$59,999	-0.031 (0.100)
\$60,000-\$99,999	0.040 (0.126)
\$100,000-\$149,999	0.159 (0.146)
More than \$150,000	-0.321** (0.148)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)	
Full time	-0.235 (0.161)
Part time	-0.140 (0.173)
Student	-0.495** (0.233)
Unemployed-looking	-0.355** (0.168)
Unemployed-not looking	-0.460** (0.205)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)	
25 - 34	0.247* (0.130)
35 - 44	0.400*** (0.131)
45 - 54	0.394*** (0.138)
55 - 64	0.495*** (0.139)
65 - 74	0.287* (0.173)
75 or older	-0.019 (0.229)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)	
Northeast	0.029 (0.102)
South	-0.080 (0.090)
West	-0.049 (0.102)
<b>Interactions</b> (reference= Control X Business X Above Climate Median)	
Green X Competition	-0.237 (0.191)
Green X Below Climate Median	-1.459*** (0.183)
Competition X Below Climate Median	-0.180 (0.182)
Green X Competition X Below Climate Median	0.454* (0.259)
N	2,308
R <sup>2</sup>	0.148

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

**TABLE A6.** *Effect of Cues on for Tax Policy: Climate Jobs*

<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)	
Green	-0.688*** (0.173)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)	
China Competition	0.317* (0.178)
<b>Effect of Climate Spending on Job</b> (reference= Negative effect)	
Positive effect	0.096 (0.174)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)	
Male	-0.319*** (0.088)
Other	-0.241** (0.100)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)	0.422** (0.180)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)	
Advanced Degree	0.287* (0.151)
Bachelor's degree	-0.020 (0.151)
Some college	0.031 (0.152)
High school graduate	0.227 (0.297)
No high school	0.233* (0.124)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)	
\$30,000-\$59,999	0.058 (0.135)
\$60,000-\$99,999	0.102 (0.166)
\$100,000-\$149,999	0.313* (0.190)
More than \$150,000	-0.373* (0.207)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)	
Full time	-0.354 (0.221)
Part time	-0.136 (0.238)
Student	-0.544* (0.313)
Unemployed-looking	-0.416* (0.238)
Unemployed-not looking	-0.380 (0.327)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)	
25 - 34	0.211 (0.166)
35 - 44	0.356** (0.170)
45 - 54	0.355** (0.180)
55 - 64	0.536*** (0.182)
65 - 74	0.359 (0.228)
75 or older	-0.176 (0.314)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)	
Northeast	0.100 (0.135)
South	-0.153 (0.122)
West	-0.029 (0.136)
<b>Interactions</b> (reference= Control X Business X Negative Effect on Job)	
Green X Competition	0.373 (0.244)
Green X Positive Effect on Job	1.455*** (0.243)
Competition X Positive Effect on Job	-0.004 (0.244)
Green X Competition X Positive Effect on Job	-0.372 (0.342)
N	1.496
R <sup>2</sup>	0.131

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

TABLE A7. *Effect of Cues on Vote Choice*

	Baseline (1)	Controls included (2)
<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)		
Green	0.272*** (0.085)	0.298*** (0.079)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)		
China Competition	0.228*** (0.086)	0.235*** (0.080)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)		
Male		-0.164*** (0.058)
Other		-0.016 (0.069)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)		0.265** (0.118)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree		0.115 (0.098)
Bachelor's degree		-0.011 (0.098)
Some college		0.035 (0.099)
High school graduate		-0.178 (0.195)
No high school		-0.040 (0.080)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)		
\$30,000-\$59,999		-0.027 (0.088)
\$60,000-\$99,999		-0.082 (0.110)
\$100,000-\$149,999		0.077 (0.128)
More than \$150,000		-0.268** (0.130)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)		
Full time		-0.329** (0.141)
Part time		-0.152 (0.151)
Student		-0.559*** (0.204)
Unemployed-looking		-0.241 (0.147)
Unemployed-not looking		-0.333* (0.180)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)		
25 - 34		0.001 (0.114)
35 - 44		0.031 (0.115)
45 - 54		-0.074 (0.122)
55 - 64		0.004 (0.124)
65 - 74		-0.022 (0.153)
75 or older		-0.494** (0.202)
<b>PID (inc. leaners)</b> (reference= Democrat)		
Republican		-0.124 (0.090)
No preference		-0.243*** (0.093)
<b>Social Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		0.345* (0.195)
Liberal		0.392* (0.204)
Conservative		0.144 (0.205)
<b>Economic Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		-0.297 (0.195)
Liberal		-0.341* (0.204)
Conservative		-0.218 (0.202)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast		-0.023 (0.090)
South		-0.072 (0.079)
West		-0.055 (0.090)
<b>Climate concern index</b> (1-7)		0.337*** (0.022)
<b>Nationalism index</b> (1-7)		0.150*** (0.023)
<b>Interaction</b> (reference= Control—Business)		
Green—China Competition	-0.043 (0.121)	-0.007 (0.112)
N		2,337
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.181

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses. Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

TABLE A8. *AMCEs*

<b>Policy Tool</b> (reference= Direct govt spending)		
Increased govt regulation		-0.019** (0.009)
Tax credits for consumers		0.112*** (0.009)
Tax credits for corporations		-0.012 (0.009)
<b>Industry target</b> (reference= Agriculture)		
Energy		0.013* (0.007)
Manufacturing		0.006 (0.007)
<b>Domestic effects</b> (reference= Help slow down the domestic effects of climate change)		
Increase the cost of fossil fuel compared to renewable energy		-0.113*** (0.009)
Encourage foreign investment into the United States		-0.057*** (0.009)
Create a substantial number of clean energy jobs		0.039*** (0.009)
<b>International effects</b> (reference= Help slow down the global effects of climate change)		
Promote U.S. national interest by deepening collaboration and cooperation with other countries		-0.023*** (0.007)
Advance U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries		-0.032*** (0.008)
<b>Policy cost</b> (reference= \$100 Billion)		
\$200 Billion		-0.025*** (0.008)
\$400 Billion		-0.044*** (0.009)
\$600 Billion		-0.078*** (0.009)
<b>Partisan support</b> (reference= Endorsed by Democrats)		
Endorsed by Democrats and some Republicans		0.077*** (0.007)
N		27,966

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with ID-specific adjustments to standard errors shown in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

TABLE A9. *Subgroup Marginal Means: Partisanship*

Feature	Level	Republican	Democrat	Difference
cj_tool	Direct government spending	0.473 (0.008)	0.485 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.012)
cj_tool	Increased government regulation	0.442 (0.008)	0.482 (0.009)	-0.04 (0.012)
cj_tool	Tax credits for consumers	0.596 (0.008)	0.591 (0.008)	0.006 (0.012)
cj_tool	Tax credits for corporations	0.488 (0.008)	0.44 (0.008)	0.048 (0.012)
cj_industry	Agriculture	0.494 (0.007)	0.487 (0.007)	0.008 (0.01)
cj_industry	Energy	0.496 (0.007)	0.518 (0.007)	-0.022 (0.009)
cj_industry	Manufacturing	0.51 (0.007)	0.495 (0.006)	0.015 (0.009)
cj_domestic	Help slow down the domestic effects of climate change	0.53 (0.008)	0.545 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.012)
cj_domestic	Increase the cost of fossil fuel compared to renewable energy	0.419 (0.008)	0.425 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.012)
cj_domestic	Encourage foreign investment into the United States	0.491 (0.008)	0.453 (0.009)	0.038 (0.012)
cj_domestic	Create a substantial number of clean energy jobs	0.56 (0.008)	0.577 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.012)
cj_international	Help slow down the global effects of climate change	0.481 (0.007)	0.544 (0.007)	-0.063 (0.01)
cj_international	Promote U.S. national interest by deepening collaboration and cooperation with other countries	0.5 (0.007)	0.494 (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)
cj_international	Advance U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries	0.52 (0.007)	0.461 (0.007)	0.059 (0.01)
cj_spend	\$100 billion	0.56 (0.009)	0.517 (0.008)	0.042 (0.012)
cj_spend	\$200 billion	0.5 (0.008)	0.516 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.011)
cj_spend	\$400 billion	0.494 (0.008)	0.497 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.011)
cj_spend	\$600 billion	0.446 (0.009)	0.469 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.012)
cj_partisan	Endorsed by Democrats	0.425 (0.005)	0.502 (0.005)	-0.077 (0.007)
cj_partisan	Endorsed by Democrats and some Republicans	0.576 (0.005)	0.498 (0.005)	0.078 (0.007)

Notes:

Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the respondent level. Columns present the marginal means of Republican and Democratic respondents along with the difference between them.



**TABLE A10.** *Subgroup Marginal Means: Climate Score*

Feature	Level	Below Median Climate Score	Above Median Climate Score
cj_tool	Direct government spending	0.478 (0.007)	0.481 (0.008)
cj_tool	Increased government regulation	0.438 (0.007)	0.487 (0.008)
cj_tool	Tax credits for consumers	0.594 (0.007)	0.585 (0.008)
cj_tool	Tax credits for corporations	0.487 (0.007)	0.447 (0.008)
cj_industry	Agriculture	0.498 (0.006)	0.488 (0.007)
cj_industry	Energy	0.497 (0.006)	0.521 (0.006)
cj_industry	Manufacturing	0.504 (0.006)	0.491 (0.006)
cj_domestic	Help slow down the domestic effects of climate change	0.522 (0.007)	0.545 (0.008)
cj_domestic	Increase the cost of fossil fuel compared to renewable energy	0.423 (0.007)	0.42 (0.008)
cj_domestic	Encourage foreign investment into the United States	0.499 (0.007)	0.445 (0.008)
cj_domestic	Create a substantial number of clean energy jobs	0.556 (0.007)	0.589 (0.008)
cj_international	Help slow down the global effects of climate change	0.491 (0.006)	0.546 (0.007)
cj_international	Promote U.S. national interest by deepening collaboration and cooperation with other countries	0.496 (0.006)	0.493 (0.006)
cj_international	Advance U.S. national interest by prioritizing economic competition with other countries	0.513 (0.006)	0.46 (0.007)
cj_spend	\$100 billion	0.555 (0.008)	0.515 (0.008)
cj_spend	\$200 billion	0.514 (0.007)	0.509 (0.008)
cj_spend	\$400 billion	0.492 (0.007)	0.494 (0.008)
cj_spend	\$600 billion	0.441 (0.007)	0.481 (0.008)
cj_partisan	Endorsed by Democrats	0.452 (0.005)	0.475 (0.005)
cj_partisan	Endorsed by Democrats and some Republicans	0.547 (0.005)	0.525 (0.005)

*Notes:*

Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the respondent level. Columns present the marginal means of respondents with below median pre-treatment climate score, and above median scores along with the differences between the groups)

## A.5.2 Robustness Checks

TABLE A11. *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy: PartyID Leaners excluded*

<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)	
Green	0.930*** (0.164)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)	
China Competition	0.353** (0.162)
<b>PID (pure)</b> (reference= Democrat)	
Republican	0.074 (0.167)
No preference	-0.232*** (0.083)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)	
Male	-0.049 (0.102)
Other	0.407** (0.163)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)	
	0.262* (0.140)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)	
Advanced Degree	-0.016 (0.141)
Bachelor's degree	-0.087 (0.141)
Some college	-0.095 (0.325)
High school graduate	0.074 (0.118)
No high school	0.049 (0.126)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)	
\$30,000-\$59,999	0.075 (0.157)
\$60,000-\$99,999	0.121 (0.181)
\$100,000-\$149,999	-0.327* (0.187)
More than \$150,000	-0.455** (0.204)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)	
Full time	-0.259 (0.214)
Part time	-0.465 (0.317)
Student	-0.436** (0.218)
Unemployed-looking	-0.667** (0.269)
Unemployed-not looking	0.154 (0.173)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)	
25 - 34	0.436** (0.175)
35 - 44	0.285 (0.182)
45 - 54	0.491*** (0.180)
55 - 64	0.409* (0.217)
65 - 74	0.109 (0.284)
75 or older	-0.043 (0.129)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)	
Northeast	-0.102 (0.112)
South	-0.013 (0.127)
West	-0.276 (0.229)
<b>Interactions</b> (reference= Business, Democrat, Control)	
Green X Republican	-1.538*** (0.231)
Competition X Republican	0.138 (0.230)
Green X Competition X Republican	0.305 (0.322)
N	1,570
R <sup>2</sup>	0.126

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

TABLE A12. *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy: Compilers Only*

	Baseline (1)	Controls included (2)
<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)		
Green	-0.033 (0.117)	0.011 (0.106)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)		
China Competition	0.473*** (0.124)	0.448*** (0.113)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)		
Male		-0.158** (0.078)
Other		0.004 (0.095)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)		0.378** (0.155)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree		0.407*** (0.130)
Bachelor's degree		0.087 (0.132)
Some college		0.142 (0.136)
High school graduate		0.232 (0.267)
No high school		-0.052 (0.110)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)		
\$30,000-\$59,999		-0.104 (0.121)
\$60,000-\$99,999		-0.025 (0.150)
\$100,000-\$149,999		-0.194 (0.171)
More than \$150,000		-0.420** (0.173)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)		
Full time		-0.386** (0.190)
Part time		-0.351* (0.199)
Student		-0.644** (0.297)
Unemployed-looking		-0.531*** (0.193)
Unemployed-not looking		-0.525** (0.234)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)		
25 - 34		0.107 (0.162)
35 - 44		0.327** (0.163)
45 - 54		0.321* (0.170)
55 - 64		0.393** (0.171)
65 - 74		0.146 (0.206)
75 or older		-0.287 (0.277)
<b>PID (inc. leaners)</b> (reference= Democrat)		
Republican		-0.198 (0.126)
No preference		-0.143 (0.128)
<b>Social Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		0.399 (0.264)
Liberal		0.412 (0.276)
Conservative		0.382 (0.279)
<b>Economic Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		-0.214 (0.257)
Liberal		-0.426 (0.270)
Conservative		-0.125 (0.268)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast		0.020 (0.119)
South		-0.086 (0.105)
West		-0.141 (0.119)
<b>Climate concern index</b> (1-7)		0.465*** (0.030)
<b>Nationalism index</b> (1-7)		0.143*** (0.032)
<b>Interaction</b> (reference= Control—Business)		
Green—China Competition	-0.151 (0.168)	-0.111 (0.153)
N	1,488	1,470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.235

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses. Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

TABLE A13. *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy: Sincere*

	Baseline (1)	Controls included (2)
<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)		
Green	0.171 (0.113)	0.237** (0.105)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)		
China Competition	0.491*** (0.111)	0.533*** (0.104)
<b>Gender</b> (reference= Female)		
Male		-0.209*** (0.076)
Other		-0.074 (0.095)
<b>Non-White</b> (reference= White)		0.299** (0.151)
<b>Education</b> (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree		0.158 (0.125)
Bachelor's degree		-0.066 (0.127)
Some college		-0.016 (0.131)
High school graduate		-0.118 (0.269)
No high school		-0.074 (0.108)
<b>Income</b> (reference= Up to \$29,999)		
\$30,000-\$59,999		-0.200* (0.116)
\$60,000-\$99,999		-0.017 (0.144)
\$100,000-\$149,999		-0.007 (0.165)
More than \$150,000		-0.439*** (0.167)
<b>Employment</b> (reference= Disabled)		
Full time		-0.252 (0.184)
Part time		-0.232 (0.190)
Student		-0.566** (0.279)
Unemployed-looking		-0.337* (0.191)
Unemployed-not looking		-0.425* (0.234)
<b>Age</b> (reference= 18 - 24)		
25 - 34		0.244 (0.165)
35 - 44		0.391** (0.164)
45 - 54		0.324* (0.171)
55 - 64		0.438** (0.172)
65 - 74		0.244 (0.205)
75 or older		-0.257 (0.262)
<b>PID (inc. leaners)</b> (reference= Democrat)		
Republican		-0.081 (0.120)
No preference		-0.201 (0.125)
<b>Social Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		0.195 (0.257)
Liberal		0.530* (0.271)
Conservative		0.212 (0.271)
<b>Economic Ideology</b> (reference= Haven't thought much about)		
Moderate		0.003 (0.251)
Liberal		-0.276 (0.267)
Conservative		0.026 (0.262)
<b>Region</b> (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast		0.086 (0.116)
South		-0.081 (0.103)
West		-0.033 (0.116)
<b>Climate concern index</b> (1-7)		0.398*** (0.029)
<b>Nationalism index</b> (1-7)		0.122*** (0.031)
<b>Interaction</b> (reference= Control—Business)		
Green—China Competition	-0.134 (0.159)	-0.135 (0.147)
N	1,721	1,700
R <sup>2</sup>	0.018	0.199

Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses.  
Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

**TABLE A14.** *Effect of Cues on Support for Tax Policy: Ordered Probit Model*

<b>Type Treatment</b> (reference= Business)	
Green	0.109* (0.060)
<b>Competition Treatment</b> (reference= Control)	
China Competition	0.225*** (0.060)
<b>Competition X Type</b> (reference= Control X Business)	
Green X Competition	-0.018 (0.085)
N	2,337
Log Likelihood	-4,238.256

Coefficients reported from ordered probit model with standard error in parentheses. Significance codes: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

## A.6 Appendix References

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